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Abstract
The  large  and  vibrant  informal  trade  between  India,  and  Bangladesh  continues  to  thrive  despite 
unilateral/regional/multilateral  trade liberalisation in these two countries.  This calls  for  an in-depth 
analysis of India's informal trade with Bangladesh. Recent studies have also shown that even in today’s 
globalised world, informal trade barriers still do exist  and inhibit trade flows, particularly so in the 
developing countries. This can arise due to a host of factors such as, complex customs procedures, 
capacity  constraints  and/or  corruption  at  the  border.  These  types  of  non-tariff  barriers/structural 
impediments are less obvious but are also more difficult to directly measure.  Particularly,  with the 
decline in tariff rates of protection after the Uruguay round, the trade facilitation measures, the other 
name  for  reduction  in  transaction  costs  for  trading  goods  has  become  an  issues  of  significant 
importance  in  today’s  world.  In this  context,  this  paper  attempts  to  analyse  the  interplay between 
shortcoming of trade facilitation measures in India-Bangladesh border and growth of informal trade. 
Using  insights  from the  New Institutional  Economics  informal  and formal  institutions  engaged  in 
cross-border trade are contrasted to examine whether informal  trading arrangements  provide better 
institutional solutions. The study is based on primary data collated through surveys. 
1 These are my personal views. The author is a senior researcher at NCAER.
1. Introduction
In recent years, India and Bangladesh  have adopted not only unilateral trade 
policy  reforms but  have  also  undertaken  liberalisation  under  Uruguay  Round and 
successive  rounds  of  South  Asian  Preferential  Trading  Arrangements  (SAPTA).2 
Despite  these,  recent  works  (Chaudhari,  1995;  Taneja,  1999)  indicate  that  India’s 
informal trade with Bangladesh continues to thrive and shows no sign of decline. In 
this  context,  the present study attempts  to  understand the elements  underlying  the 
vitality  of informal  trading arrangements  as  well  as to  identify  the bottlenecks of 
formal trading arrangement between India and Bangladesh.  Specifically, the study 
focuses on the following three issues of interest in the context of India's informal 
trade: (a) what are the characteristics of informal trade, (b) why it takes place, and (c) 
how it differs from formal trade. 
Understandably, traders have incentives to trade informally (provided the risks 
are low) if the economic returns are more. This may arise due to various factors such 
as: 
• high tariffs and non-tariff barriers;
• domestic policy distortions such as subsidised public distribution system give rise 
economic incentives to trade these items in the neighbouring country if it fetches 
high prices;
• if the infrastructure supporting formal trade is weak and costs of trading increase 
substantially with higher volumes, some of it may spill over into informal trading; 
• existence  of  an  efficient  institutional  arrangement  may  attract  traders  to  the 
informal channel; 
• the rent-seeking activities of the public servants at each step of transactions may 
dissuade traders from using the official channel;
• low education level of traders may drive them from the formal channel.
The  study  has  used  extensive  primary  survey  conducted  in  India  and 
Bangladesh to analyse the institutional mechanism that enable informal trade to take 
place  between  India  and  Bangladesh.  Using  insights  from  the  New  Institutional 
Economics, the study contrasted informal and formal institutions engaged in cross-
border  trade  in  an  effort  to  examine  the  transaction  environments  of  formal  and 
2In  1991, South Asian countries  of Bhutan,  Bangladesh,  India,  Maldives,  Sri  Lanka,  Pakistan,  and 
Nepal   established a preferential trading block in the region. Since then three rounds of SAPTA have 
been concluded. The member countries have also envisaged the formation of a free trading block by 
2001. 
informal  traders,  to  understand  whether  informal  trading  arrangements  provide 
efficient  institutional  solutions  and  how  lacuna  in  trade  facilitation  has  led  to 
informalisation of trade between India and Bangladesh.  It needs to be emphasised 
that  since  the  sample  frame  for  informal  traders  was  drawn  from  an  unknown 
population, the survey estimates may only be indicative and not firm estimates. 
2. Trade Facilitation Bottleneck of India-Bangladesh Border3
According to the studies by Choudhury (1995), Taneja (1999), West Bengal is 
the principal transportation hub of informal trade between India/Bangladesh. In this 
context, it would be useful to examine the structural bottlenecks that formal exporters 
from West Bengal have to bear with. To a great extent, the transporter’s/exporter’s 
nightmare  in  the  context  of  exports  to  Bangladesh  has  lead  to  “persistent  open 
smuggling” in which all the stake-holders (police, government, BSF, traders, poticial 
parities, etc) have a role to play.
Three LCSs in West Bengal, namely Petrapole, Mahadipur and Hilli are the 
most important  gateways for trade with Bangladesh in terms of trade volume and 
value. For our understanding, Table 1 provides a summary picture of the physical 
infrastructure at these LCSs. As this table shows, parking lots in all the LCSs lack the 
basic amenities like drinking water and toilet. The approach roads to the LCSs are 
congested. The frequent power cuts coupled with low voltage at the LCSs adversely 
affect the efficiency of customs officials. Surprisingly, there is no government-bonded 
warehouse in these LCSs. Thefts from parking lots are common and corruption is 
rampant. Since the problems prevailing in the three LCSs are similar in nature, we 
have chosen Petrapole border for our in-depth study as it handle the highest trade 
(66% in value terms during 2001-2002) between India and Bangladesh. 
Petrapole is located about 95 kilometres from Kolkata. The commodities that 
are traded through Petrapole LCS originate from all over India. Kolkata is the final 
transhipment area for most of these commodities and they are carried to the Petrapole 
border by trucks through the National Highway 35, formerly known as Jessore Road 
as  it  originates  from Jessore  in  Bangladesh.  The  delay  in  this  route  is  a  normal 
phenomenon  due  to  the  heavy traffic,  three  railway crossings  and five  congested 
towns  (Barasat,  Dutta  Pukur,  Ashoknagar,  Habra  and  Bongaon)  en  route,  poor 
physical condition and narrow width of the road, and encroachments. Another major 
hurdle in transportation is the narrow Naobhasa Bridge, which is located 3 kilometres 
3 The finding of this section is drawn from Das and Pohit (2006)
prior to Petrapole. The bridge is so narrow that at a time only one truck can pass. 
Moreover, heavy trucks with carrying capacity of 15 to 18 tonnes or more cannot pass 
through this bridge due to its poor condition. This results in transhipment either in 
Kolkata or Bongaon incurring additional transportation cost and time. 
Table 1: Bottlenecks in Physical Infrastructure and Procedural Hazards
Facility Hilli Mahadipur Petrapole
Approach
Road to LCS
• Single lane congested road • Poor physical 
condition 
• Passes through congested 
towns & places infested by 
hawkers.
Parking lot • No sanitation facility and 
inadequate drinking facility.
• Not secured -  loss through 
theft
• Prevalence of speed money
• Lack of basic 
amenities.
• Highly 
discriminatory 
parking fees
• Not secured -  loss 
through theft
• Prevalence of 
speed money
• No sanitation facility and 
inadequate drinking water 
facility.
• Not secured -  loss through 
theft
• Prevalence of speed money
Warehouse 
• No government bonded 
warehousing
• No government 
bonded 
warehousing
• No government bonded 
warehousing
Others • Poor quality of power
• Local clubs with political 
affiliations extort exporters 
for donations
• Hilli not notified in Duty 
Entitlement Pass Book 
(DEPB) port registration – 
traders of DEPB items not 
getting the benefit.
• Poor quality of 
power affects 
efficiency of 
customs officials
• Absence of  bank 
collection centre
• No office space for 
clearing & 
forwarding agents 
• Irregular power supply 
with low voltage 
• Single gate for export, 
import  and passengers
• Frequent strikes delay 
official work 
• Electronic Data 
Interchange (EDI) 
ineffective due to lack of 
efficient operator
  
Merchandise has to face substantial loss of time at the border. The delay takes 
place  at  the  parking  lot,  in  customs  clearance  and  at  the  entry/exit  point.  It  is 
mandatory for the trucks coming from Kolkata during daytime to park at Bongaon 
Municipality Parking instead of moving directly towards the Central  Warehousing 
Corporation (CWC) parking lot which is situated near the border gate and adjacent to 
the Indian Customs House.
The existing custom clearance  procedures  at  the  border  lead to  significant 
costs  and  delays.  The  existing  custom  procedures  and  documentation  are  not 
transparent. As a result,  all the exporters employ clearing agents on a commission 
basis to take up the responsibilities of all paper works at the border.  Although, there 
is  no  official  fees  for  paper  work  at  customs  office,  exporters  have  to  bear  for 
overtime allowances of custom staffs if they want their consignment to be cleared on 
holidays or before/after the scheduled working hours. Recently,  the government of 
India introduced the Electronic Data Information (EDI) system at custom office at 
Petrapole  for  streamlining  the  system.  However,  the  system did  not  have  smooth 
operation and so the manual clearing of papers is still the norm. 
The entry point at the border has one single gate, which is used for exports, 
imports  as  well  as  for  passenger  movement.  At  a  time,  only  one  truck  can  pass 
through the gate. As a result, the entry point remains very congested. Big trees at the 
entry-exit  point  often  become  irritants  to  traffic  flow.  The  Indian  trucks  after 
unloading at Benapole (in Bangladesh) are allowed to enter India only after 7 PM. or 
are allowed to return to India before the start of exports from India (i.e. 10 AM). This 
results in wastage of time together with payment of detention charges.
A  trader/exporter  incurs  transaction  costs  in  all  the  phases  of  the  export 
process  starting from obtaining information about  market  conditions  in  any given 
foreign market and ending with receipt of final payment. In a recent paper by Das and 
Pohit  (2006),  an  attempt  was  made  too  quantify  these  costs  on  the  basis  of 
information collated through field survey of exporters/transporters engaged in India-
Bangladesh  trade.4 For  clarity,  the  entire  activities  related  to  exports  through  the 
Petrapole-Benapole border have been divided into the following three distinct phases: 
Phase  1  -  loading  at  Kolkata,  unloading  at  Benapole  in  Bangladesh  and 
crossing of border while returning from Bangladesh 
Phase 2 - transportation and 
Phase 3 - exports including parking, customs clearance and crossing of border 
during exports. 
The  information  on  transaction  costs  needs  further  clarifications.  In  our 
analysis,  the transaction costs that are quantified are only those incurred by Indian 
exporters up to the point at which they leave their cargoes in Bangladesh. Transaction 
costs beyond this point in Bangladesh are not quantified, so the total transaction costs 
4 In all, the estimates were based on 88 exporters and 25 transporters.
of India-Bangladesh trade are not quantified. To be specific, the present paper solely 
deals with the total additional transaction costs incurred by the Indian exporters. Even 
in  quantifying  the  additional  transaction  costs  of  the  Indian  exporters,  certain 
transaction costs are not picked up in the survey.5
Table 2 indicates that the aggregate delay (loss of time) pertaining to all the 
three phases of exports turns out to be around 99 hours on an average (approximately 
4 days) for a single shipment.  The data suggests that the aggregate delay could be as 
high as 192 hours (8 days).
It is clear from the above discussion that there are structural bottlenecks that 
the  exporters  from West  Bengal  have  to  bear  with.  Understandably,  some  of  the 
bottlenecks need more time to be solved and the policy-makers may work towards 
solving it. However, the issues that can be sorted out in short period of times should 
be  addressed  at  first  to  give  the  right  signal  to  the  exporters/investors  that  the 
government  means  business.  The  natural  question  that  arises  why  the  state 
government of West Bengal is so lax in improving the infrastructure related to trade in 
West Bengal, while these days, the same is viewed among the investors as one of the 
most  investment-friendly  state  of  India.  Though  the  state  receives  a  share  of  the 
overall revenue collection from import/export activities as per directives of finance 
commission, given the uncertainties of the behaviours of the other states, it is quite 
rational in this kind of non-co-operative game for an individual state government to 
be less pro-active towards exports originating from the state. This is a real puzzle 
since  we  can  see  in  other  parts  of  world  (Dubai,  Singapore,  Colombo),  what  a 
transportation hub can do for  the economy.  While  it  may be argued that  Dubai’s 
growth is partly due to the oil exports, the same is not true of Singapore, or Colombo.
The poor state of affairs in LCS of West Bengal is obviously an important 
factor of the growth and existence of informal trade between India and Bangladesh. 
However,  as  well  will  see  below,  other  factors,  also  play  a  crucial  role  for  the 
informalisation of trade. 
Table 2: Loss of Time in Exports
Stages Ideal time 
(hrs)
Loss of time 
(hrs)
Max. reported 
Loss (hrs)
5 For example, theft in the border parking lots which presumably leads to increased insurance costs and 
the costs involved in pre-shipment inspection are not covered in this paper.
Phase 1- Loading at Kolkata, unloading at Benapole in 
Bangladesh and crossing of border while returning from 
Bangladesh
5.9 17.8 91
Phase 2- Transportation 2.4 3.2 5
Phase 3- Exports including parking, customs clearance 
and crossing of border during exports
21.3 78.1 96
Cumulative 29.6 99.1 192
3. Informalisation of Trade
Our understanding  of  informalisation  are  primarily  drawn from our  earlier 
works (Pohit and Taneja, 2003, Das and Pohit, 2006) and recent field visits to the 
border districts of West Bengal.  To understand the mechanism and functioning of 
informal trading markets, a survey was conducted during 1999 in border district of 
West Bengal and the corresponding regions in Bangladesh.6 Given the time and cost 
consideration, 200 traders consisting of 100 traders each in the formal and informal 
channel, split equally between the two countries, were covered.  
Under  formal  trading  arrangements,  the  recourse  to  law  defines  contracts 
between two contracting parties.  This ensures that goods move across borders and 
payments  are  guaranteed.  On the  other  hand contracting  parties  in  informal  trade 
cannot  resort  to  the  law  for  violation  of  terms  of  contract.  Consequently,  it  is 
reasonable  to  assume  that  individuals  trading  through  informal  channel  have 
developed  parallel  institutional  mechanisms  for  contract  enforcement  and  dispute 
settlement.  It  therefore  becomes  imperative  to  focus  on  issues  of  enforcement 
mechanisms including aspects of risk and information in informal  trading. On the 
other hand it is important to understand the institutional structure that supports formal 
trade  where exchange is  affected by factors  which are not  related to the physical 
process  of  production,  such  as,  administrative  processes,  government  rules  and 
regulations, infrastructure bottlenecks etc.
The current analysis is carried out using insights from the New Institutional 
Economics (NIE). The NIE differs from both neo-classical economics and from the 
'old  institutional  approach'.  While  neo-classical  economics  focuses  on  perfect 
markets, such theory is devoid of institutions. The 'old institutional approach' on the 
other hand, recognises the importance of institutions but does not provide a theoretical 
foundation (Langlois, 1986). In contrast, the New Institutional Economics questions 
the two crucial assumptions of neo-classical economics namely cost-less transactions 
6 Chaudhari (1995) reported that nearly 95% of illegal exports to Bangladesh goes from West Bengal
and perfect information and stresses on the role of institutions in facilitating market 
exchange  by  reducing  transactions  costs,  providing  a  predictable  framework  for 
exchange and overcoming imperfect information (Assaad, 1993; Bardhan, 1989).
In the present context it is argued that while both institutional arrangements 
i.e. the formal and informal facilitate trade in goods across countries, they are carried 
out  at  a  cost  viz.,  transactions  cost.  These  costs  include  those  of  organising, 
maintaining  and  enforcing  the  rules  of  an  institutional  arrangement.  A  rational 
behaviour  would  imply  that  a  more  efficient  institution  (in  terms of  lower  costs) 
should be preferred over less efficient one (Coase, 1960).  
Key determinants of transaction costs for formal trading in a particular country 
are the institutions, i.e. the rules and regulations that affect economic activities. Well-
designed  institutions  provide  traders  with  a  predictable  framework  and  necessary 
business information at a cost that encourages them to comply with and pay for these 
institutions. Poorly designed institutions require traders to comply with burdensome 
rules and regulations and deal with inefficient, corrupt government agencies, and offer 
few benefits  in  return.  Such  institutions  increase  transaction  costs,  lower  traders’ 
incentives to comply, and hinder political and economic participation.
Below, we elaborate our key survey findings.
3.1 Survey Observations: General
At a general level the survey points to the evidence of a one way trade flow 
from India to Bangladesh. The survey data was also used to understand the sourcing 
network for procurement of goods for informal trade. The survey reveals that a large 
proportion of goods traded from India to Bangladesh are procured from other states in 
India. Also, the survey provides evidence of leakage of goods from the Indian Public 
Distribution System to Bangladesh.  
3.2.Entry & Informal Channels in Informal Trading
Given  the  nature  of  informal  trading,  how difficult  is  entry  into  informal 
trading? What kind of costs do traders incur to make an entry into informal trading? 
Firms were asked how they entered informal trading. The survey revealed that in the 
absence  of  formal  contracts  between  trading  partners,  the  informal  trading 
arrangements  were  characterised  by  non-anonymity  of  transaction.  Thus,  74%  of 
respondents in either Bangladesh or India entered through a friend or relative (see 
Table 3). 
Table 3 Entry Characteristics of Informal Traders (% of Respondents)
Entry in informal trading Friend Relative Own initiative
Bangladesh  
India
40
62
34 
12
26 
26
The mechanism that supports information flows is also very important since 
what the transacting parties know and do not know will determine systematically the 
arrangements that will characterise exchange between them. Informal trade hinges on 
how  traders  can  obtain  information  on  commodities  and  quantities  to  be  traded. 
Traders  in  both  India  and  Bangladesh  were  asked  how  they  obtained  such 
information. It can be seen from Table 4 that making personal trips was the most 
important channel for information for Indian as well as Bangladeshi traders. 
Table 4 Information Channels (% of respondents)
Sources of Information Bangladesh & India
Authorised channel 21
Personal trips 84
Distribution network 82
Official media 32
Enforcement agencies 37
Trade fairs 10
Note: Traders have the option of ticking more than one 
option
Given  the  institutional  focus  of  the  study,  information  on  contractual 
arrangements between trading partners was also sought. Our survey findings indicate 
that prior dealing and advance payments  are the two crucial factors governing the 
contractual arrangement. 
3.3. Risk & Transaction costs  
An aspect  crucial  in  informal  trading  is  the  risk  associated  with  informal 
trading.  The  vital  aspects  here  are  extent  of  risk,  risk  sharing  arrangements  and 
mechanisms  of  risk  mitigation  that  are  prevalent  among  trading  partners  trading 
informally. 
Table 5 reported that the probability of getting caught is very low in both the 
countries. Informal traders have developed several mechanisms to assuage the extent 
of risk. As mentioned earlier, non-anonymous transacting is an important mechanism 
for minimising risk. Further, they make payments to enforcement agencies to mitigate 
risk. As Table 5 shows, 60% of the Bangladeshi traders paid bribes between 3% to 
6% of their turnover whereas 78% of the Indian traders paid between 1% to 3%. To 
diversify  risk,  one  obvious  way  for  informal  traders  is  to  have  large  number  of 
transactions.
Table 5  Stylised Facts of Risk for Informal Traders (Percent of Respondents)
Probability of goods being seized <.05 0.05-0.1 0.1-0.2 >0.2
Bangladesh
India
20
72
58
26
18
2
0
0
Payments to enforcement agencies 1-3 % 3-6 % 6-10% > 10 %
Bangladesh
India
28
78
60
18
12
4
0
0
 
Information  was  also  sought  from  the  traders  regarding  their  combined 
transaction costs as percentage of turnover in terms of bribes to enforcement agencies, 
transportation costs, cost of credit and cost of currency conversion. Table 6 shows that 
50% of the informal traders in Bangladesh had to make payments between 10% and 
20% of their turnover in the form of transaction costs while in India 60% of them had 
to bear transaction costs of less than 10% of their turnover. 
Table 6   Transaction Cost of Informal Traders (Percent of Respondents)
Transaction Cost in <10% 10% - 20% 20% - 30% >30%
Bangladesh 25 50 21 4
India 60 38 2 -
In  the same spirit,  information was also sought  from the survey of  formal 
traders regarding their combined transaction costs cost in the form of payments to 
officials as bribes at various stages, transportation cost including insurance cost, and 
cost of credit as share of their turnover. The relevant data are shown in Table 7. As 
this table shows, the combined transaction cost  under these heads is  by and large 
lower in India than in Bangladesh.
Table 7 Transaction cost of Formal Traders (Percent of Respondents)
TC  as % of their turnover In India In Bangladesh
Less than 10% 24 22
10%  to 20% 40
20%  to 30% 36 20
More than 30% 58
3.4. Reasons for Informal Trade
The traditional argument is that informal trade takes place due to trade and 
domestic policy distortions. As and when such distortions are corrected informal trade 
would shift  to the formal channel.  However,  our survey revealed that institutional 
factors were the most important factors encouraging informal trade between India and 
Bangladesh. The top four factors (viz, quick realization of payments, no paper work, 
no procedural delays and lower transportation costs) in Bangladesh or India are found 
to be factors giving rise to transaction costs (see Table 8). The inadequate transport 
systems that have been in existence between India and Bangladesh have led to high 
transportation  costs.  With  respect  to  transit  modalities,  the  survey  has  identified 
following  bottlenecks:  port  congestion,  excessive  documentation,  delays,  slow 
movement of goods, transhipment and other indirect costs. While in India ethnic ties 
ranked fifth in importance, the presence of high duties in the official channel ranked 
fifth in Bangladesh. 
Since  perceptions  on  factors  influencing  informal  trade  were  sought  from 
Bangladeshi as well as Indian traders, a  Spearman's rank correlation was computed 
for the ranking of factors given by both kinds of respondents. It shows a high value of 
0.77 indicating converging of views regarding the factors influencing informal trade. 
Formal traders in Bangladesh and India were also asked to give their perceptions on 
the  factors  that  they  considered  important  for  informal  trade.  A Spearman's  rank 
correlation  for  perception  of  factors  between  formal  and  informal  traders  in 
Bangladesh yields a high value of 0.75.  The same for the Indian traders yields a value 
of 0.76.  Thus, there is high degree of agreement among the traders regarding the 
relative importance of various factors.
Table 8  Reasons for Informal Trade  (Percent of respondents)
F   Factors Influencing Informal trade Bangladesh India
Presence of high duties in official channel 50 18
Quantitative restrictions 34 22
Leakage of administered price goods 12 14
Absence/shortage of storage/warehousing facilities 24 6
Produced locally across border 40 22
Presence of haats/bazaar 22 20
Lower transportation cost 72 50
Lower time to reach destination for perishable commodities 36 42
Lower time to reach destination for non-perishable commodities 28 30
Absence of trading routes 0 10
No procedural delays 52 82
No paperwork 76 92
Quick realisation of payments 88 94
Lower bribes 26 38
Nexus between enforcement agencies and traders 46 30
Ethnic ties 24 42
Note:  Respondents had the option of ticking more than one factor.
4. Discriminating Characteristics of Formal & Informal Traders
This section attempts to statistically analyse the characteristics of formal and 
informal traders engaged in Indo-Bangladesh trade as well as important aspects of 
modality and behaviour of such trade. While the discussion in the earlier sections has 
thrown light on the above aspects separately for two groups of agents/regime, it does 
not  provide  conclusive  evidence  of  identifying  the  agents/regime  based  on  some 
criteria. In this section, this missing link is established by analysing the significance 
of  the  differences  between  the  two  types  of  traders/trade  in  terms  of  univariate 
statistical criterion. 
Our choice of univariate test is non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The 
advantage of using a non-parametric test is that it is free of specific assumptions about 
the distribution of the population  under analysis,  which is appropriate in our case 
given little knowledge of characteristics of informal traders. As many of the variables 
considered  here are qualitative in nature they can be classified or ranked but not 
measured   accurately,  hence  non-parametric  tests  are  more  appropriate  for  our 
analysis.  Among the various non-parametric tests, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is 
one of the more powerful ones as it utilises information on both the direction and 
magnitude of the differences within pairs.  It gives more weight to a pair that shows a 
large difference than to a pair that shows a smaller difference. The Wilcoxon signed-
rank is  applied by matching pairs of observations from the sample of formal and 
informal traders for a set of variables selected for analysis. The Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test tells us that if there are two samples X1 of formal traders and X2 of informal 
traders with n observations each then the null hypothsis tests that the median of the 
distribution of a random variable D= X1 – X2 is zero. 
Ho:    µ = 0
Where µ    is the population median.  
The test is performed by first ranking the absolute difference between matched 
pair of observations. From these ranks a z statistic is calculated by subtracting the sum 
of the ranks for negative values from the sum of the ranks with positive values and 
then dividing this number by its variance, after adjusting for zeroes and ties. Thus:
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Where  ai  is either positive one or negative one and ri    are the observed 
signed-ranks.     
For more than 25 observations, Z is approximately distributed normally. The 
results of the Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test for 13 variables governing different aspects 
of formal and informal trade are depicted in Table 9.  As this table indicates, the tests 
have been carried out separately for the Indian and Bangladeshi traders.  The database 
comprises of fifty pairs of traders for India and fourty-six pairs of observations for 
Bangladesh.   A one-tailed test has been conducted (at a 10% level of significance) 
since  we have prior  hypotheses  regarding the direction  of  the difference  in many 
cases. The results of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test are shown in Table 9.
The earlier sections have emphasised the role of transaction cost in informal 
and formal trading arrangements. One of the key hypotheses in the paper is to test 
whether  informal  trade  flourishes  because  of  lower  transaction  cost  in  informal 
trading than in formal trading. In this context the survey instrument was used to arrive 
at the transactions costs that traders incur in the two channels.7 The sign-rank test 
suggests  that  transaction  cost  in  formal  in  India  as  well  as  in  Bangladesh  is 
significantly higher than the informal counterpart.
In some cases, traders use the informal channel not because they are unwilling 
to abide by laws and regulation, but rather they lack the necessary resources to do so 
(see Kuchta-Helbling, Catherine, 2000). This occurs if lack of education deters them 
from using the formal channel. Alternatively, the lack of resources may preclude them 
from updating their knowledge in respect of changes in trade policy. A sign rank test 
of education levels of two types of traders does indicate that informal traders have 
lower education levels than the formal ones. Moreover, when we statistically judge 
the level of awareness of trade policy changes of agents in the two channels through 
the attribute awareness of SAFTA, we do find a lower level of awareness of SAFTA 
among the informal traders. 
7 Transaction costs for informal traders include payments made to enforcement agencies, transportation 
costs, cost of credit and cost of currency exchange. For formal traders transaction costs include bribes 
paid at various stages to officials, transportation costs including insurance and cost of credit.
It  has  also  been  argued  in  Taneja  (1999),  Chaudhari  (1995)  that  ethnic 
ties/family linkages play a dominant role in aiding/abetting informal trade. The test 
using data on Indian traders indicate informal traders show significantly more ethnic 
linkages than the formal ones.  However, our database on Bangladeshi traders fails to 
bring out any significant differences in ethnic linkage.
Engaging in business requires information such as how to find suppliers and 
buyers,  and  the  market  value  of  goods  and  services  being  exchanged.  Without 
inexpensive  access  to  this  information  economic  activity  becomes very  risky  and 
costly.  How  well  the  information  channel  for  informal  trading  arrangement  is 
developed is judged by the following two attributes: (a) time taken for first trade deal 
and (b) time taken for subsequent trade deal.  The result  shows that on both these 
counts, informal trading arrangement in India as well as Bangladesh function better 
than their formal counterpart.
The traders operating though the informal channel occasionally face the risk of 
goods being seized. On an average then, do the informal traders face higher risk? The 
inference  from  the  test  is  that  there  is  no  significant  difference  in  risk  element 
between the two of types  traders in  either country.  This  is  expected as a thriving 
informal trade indicate that government is failing to enforce its laws and regulations. 
Moreover, the survey suggests that informal traders make payments  to officials to 
mitigate the risk of seizures.
Table  9 Results of Wilcoxon's Signed-ranked test
                     Parameter Bangladesh Territory Indian Territory
Z statistics Inference Z statistics Inference
Transaction Cost (TC) 4.84 Fo>If* 3.27 Fo>If
Education level (Edu) 5.84 Fo>If 5.91 Fo>If
Awareness of SAFTA (SAFTA) 4.38 Fo>If 5.75 Fo>If
Education & awareness of SAFTA (EduSaf) 5.81 Fo>If 6.03 Fo>If
Ethnic ties (Ethnic) -0.63 Fo=If -3.67 Fo<If
Time taken for first trade deal  (TimFr) 1.68 Fo>If 2.14 Fo>If
Time taken for subsequent trade deal (TimSq) 5.55 Fo>If 6.15 Fo>If
Risk  -1.94 Fo<If -5.07 Fo<If
Number of transactions (Tran #) -2.37 Fo<If -2.56 Fo<If
value of trade per Transaction (Avsturnovr) 5.43 Fo>If 5.24 Fo>If
Rate of entry/exit (Ent/Ex) 1.57 Fo=If 0.16 Fo=If
Trading Period (TrdPrd) 0.83 Fo=If 1.22 Fo=If
Presence in domestic market (PreDom) 2.79 Fo>If 2.98 Fo>If
Border price differential (BorPr) -4.46 Fo>If 0.66 Fo=If
*Fo pertains to formal,  If pertains to informal. The tests have been carried out at 5 % level of significance.
Is  the  informal  trade  characterised  by  large  number  of  transactions,  each 
having  low  volume  of  trade.  We  do  find  that  value  of  trade  per  transaction 
(Avsturnover) is larger for formal traders than the informal ones both in India as well 
in Bangladesh territories.8
Is the informal trading characterised by higher rate of entry and exit than the 
formal counterpart?  In other words, is the formal trader typically in business over a 
longer period than the formal one?  The statistical test on both these counts fails to 
identify any differences.
The co-existence of trading in the domestic market with informal trading has 
been  argued  by  Chaudhari  (1995).   Is  it  the  typical  behaviour  of  only  informal 
traders?   On  the  contrary,  our  result  indicates  that  formal  traders  exhibit  larger 
presence in domestic market.
Expectedly,  the  border  price  differential  is  the driving force  for  sustaining 
informal/formal trade activities.  In this connection, one may question whether traders 
prefer one channel to another depending on the border price differential.  Our result 
partially supports the hypothesis in the sense that only in Bangladesh border price 
differential was higher in the formal channel.
5. Concluding Remarks
What  implications  for  policy  does  the  study  provide?  It  is  evident  that 
informal trade is quite large and can not be ignored in any policy dialogue. It is also 
true even that with a rapid pace of liberalisation, informal trade continues to thrive. As 
long  as  transaction  cost  in  the  formal  channel  is  sufficiently  higher  than  that  of 
informal channel, there would always be incentive for traders to transact through the 
other channel if they can work out an efficient mechanism for risk minimisation. Of 
course, lower education levels and awareness of the policy environment of traders 
deters them from accessing the formal channel. 
Understandably, the impediments to formal trade needs to be reduced. The 
plethora of administrative requirements need to be reduced drastically. For instance, 
EDI systems in Petropole, the main land route border of border trade between India-
Bangladesh   do not function efficently. Also banking facilities are inadequate in the 
border areas. Similarly the impediments at other stages of formal trade transactions 
8 This variable is generated by dividing annual turnover of a trader by the number of transaction in the 
year..
have  to  addressed  and  reduced  considerably.  The  associated  transaction  costs, 
particularly bribes have a serious connotation.  The fact  that  such costs  have been 
highlighted  in  the  context  of  cross-border  trade  is  only  the  tip  of  the  iceberg. 
Corruption is pervasive in all sectors and segments of the South Asian countries like 
India  and  Bangladesh  which  has  serious  consequences  for  the  growth  of  these 
economies. By attempting a removal of rent seeking activities at the trade level, there 
is a possibility that such changes would percolate to other sectors of the economies as 
well.
While it can well be argued that if the transacting environment for informal 
trading is more efficient than for formal trading, why not let it continue - the danger is 
that the associated money laundering to finance such trade deals might prove to be a 
threat to the smooth functioning of formal capital markets. Even though the issue of 
informal capital transfers has not been dealt with in the study, the proceeds through 
informal trading are converted into each other’s local currencies through the informal 
capital market thereby having a relevance to the study.  A focus on law enforcement 
agencies to detect and obstruct informal transit of goods across borders is not a viable 
solution as increase in enforcement mechanisms could only lead to increase in rent 
collections. What would be more effective would be to reduce the impediments to 
trade in the formal channels.  This would also have a much larger impact in the form 
of trade expansion between India and Bangladesh. 
Information is another important aspect that has to be looked into. It is true 
that a major proportion of informal traders are locals who do not have high levels of 
education or are only conversant with local languages. It cannot be expected of them 
to  understand  and  subsequently  follow  the  jargon  of  formal  trade  arrangement 
between  India  and  Bangladesh  which  are  documented  only  in  English  and  often 
difficult even for conversant persons to follow. Such gaps have to be filled by suitable 
dissemination of information and creation of awareness among traders of the various 
norms. Time delays due to unnecessarily long and complicated procedures need to be 
reduced by simplifying the procedures. 
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